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Ludmila Popkova
Political Empowerment of Women in Russia:
Discourses and Strategies
(Moterø politinës galios raiðka Rusijos visuomenëje:
diskursai ir strategijos)
Santrauka. Straipsnyje analizuojami vieðieji politinio moterø vadovavimo diskursai postkomunistinëje
Rusijoje. Autorë, remdamasi sociologiniu tyrimu, skiria dvi pagrindines – moterø politikiø ir moterø organiza-
toriø – strategijas. Pirmoji, „profesionali“, aktyvisèiø grupë svarsto moterø interesus arba moterø teisiø proble-
mas, kaip ðalutinius demokratinës darbotvarkës klausimus. Antroji, „maternalistinë“, strategija pabrëþia pri-
gimtinæ moterø politinæ „lemtá“, kurios paskirtis – rûpintis socialine ir ðeimos politika. Ðiø diskursø nagrinëji-
mas padeda suprasti Rusijos moterø politinës galios raiðkos perspektyvas, susijusias su demokratiniais pertvar-
kymais.
Women’s political activism and participa-
tion in the decision-making process may be
considered as one of the controversial issues
for the democratic transformations in the post-
communist Russia. The political transition had
allowed for women’s rights activists’ demand
an end to merely declarative gender equality
by state officials. It is necessary to evaluate the
real effects and problems of women’s politi-
cal leadership and civic activism in contempo-
rary Russia from the perspective of increasing
women’s involvement in political making de-
cisions.
In this paper I am trying to explore the
discourses on political activism and the iden-
tity of women politicians, their strategies of
political participation, and perceptions of wo-
men’s roles in the post-communism transition.
It happened quite recently that the problems
of Russian women’s political self-organization,
women’s social movements and also their stra-
tegy in the struggle for enlargement of women
representation in power have become the sub-
ject of gender analysis.
Political representation of women both on
federal and regional levels remains insufficient.
As Russian researchers say, commonly accepted
world barriers are in use here. First, they name
gender differences in political socialization,
which cause weak motivation of women in this
activity. Then comes unevenness in the distribu-
tion of different resources, which may be used
by men and women, and this unevenness limits
political possibilities of women in politics. And
the third essential factor includes particular fea-
tures of women’s course of life, demanding indi-
vidual women’s responsibility for raising children
and housekeeping. To the above mentioned fac-
tors researchers add the existence of discrimina-
tion, displayed both through unwillingness to gi-
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ve key positions in parties organizations and go-
vernment bodies to women and through the pre-
dominance of traditional gender stereotypes,
which cause distrust towards women in politics
(Temkina 1997). Judging by world experience
we may say that the extent of the development
of women’s movements is of specific impor-
tance in this situation. For that reason the we-
akness of independent women’s movements in
Russia in practice not only excludes recruiting
women-politicians out of the sphere of social
activism, but also doesn’t give an opportunity
to articulate the problem of women’s rights in
public discourse.
My research is based on interviews con-
ducted with women politicians and NGO’s ac-
tivists in Samara region. The research raised
principal questions: what are the political pri-
orities of women politicians and what are the
effective strategies of achieving gender equa-
lity in Russia. The study of political and social
women’s activities raises other a serious ques-
tion: 1) what kinds of motivation and objecti-
ves of activity of women in politics can be tra-
ced?; 2) what are their political and social in-
terests? The research was carried out on the
basis of specially arranged focused interviews
with women – leaders and participants of so-
cial organizations, deputies and candidate
members of different legislative bodies, rep-
resentatives of the regional administration eli-
te. Besides, the analysis of some documents
and public speeches was carried out as well.
Framing Women’s Activism: Legacy of the
Soviet Gender Order
In our analysis we should pay more atten-
tion to the subjective and discursive constrains
of women political choices from a perspective of
post-soviet cultural transition. In this context it
is crucial to explore the influence of past norms
of gender, culture. The Soviet state institutiona-
lized a distinctive order in which the roles of men
and women were defined according to the needs
of communist state. The state-prescribed Soviet
gender order had a significant impact on the sub-
jective perceptions of Soviet men and women.
Many researchers show that gender identities
even of the young generation are still strongly
influenced by Soviet values. Nevertheless there
is certain common them in their perceptions of
women’s roles. This is the acceptance of suppo-
sedly natural sexual difference followed by per-
ceiving of a secondary position in all spheres as
a natural.
Sociological researches show that despite ne-
gative assessment of their chances in the labor
market in politics. Women rarely claim that they
face discrimination. This is acceptance can be se-
en as a form of self-limitation on the part of wo-
men, which reinforces subordinate position.
What is more important is that the most Russian
women do not challenge the existing post-Soviet
gender order. In the transition period there has
no been any reflective period on gender relations
in a way that could be compared to the process
that took place in the Western Europe and the
United States during second wave feminism. Ins-
tead of conscious reflection on gender, we could
rather call post-Soviet ideological process the
adaptation to the social and economic necessi-
ties (Ashwin 2000).
According to the concept of the political
process transformation of conscience is a ne-
cessary condition for social and political acti-
vism. The important consequence of construc-
ting of the political collective identity is the
mechanism of group mobilization. Mobiliza-
tion could play an effective role in group’s in-
volvement into political process participation.
Some scholars stress the particular importan-
ce of mobilization in a society, experiencing
transition to the democratic regime. Mobili-
zation helps citizens to get access to new poli-
tical roles and became new political agents.
Social and political activity require a cri-
tical mass of individual who recognize that the
discrimination or oppression they are expe-
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riencing is a systematic, or political, problem,
not a personal one, and that the rectification
of the injustice they experience is possible. This
process is diversely referred to as “framing”,
“cognitive liberation”, and the “transformation
of consciousness” social movement activists, by
definition, have begun such a transformation
of consciousness. They regard the injustice or
set of injustices by a given societal group or
class, as a systematic problem. Social attitudes
toward women help enforce sex-role stereoty-
ping in Russia’s current transition period, the-
reby creating another set of attitudinal obstac-
les to the expansion of the contemporary wo-
men’s movement (Sperling 1999). It is impor-
tant to recall that a person may perceive injus-
tice as a shared, political phenomenon, yet
doubt that any public actions to alter the situa-
tion would be effective or especially in the case
of a repressive regime, even feasible.
According to the recent cross-cultural stu-
dies, women in Russia are less insensitive to
male domination than in other post-Socialist
countries. They deny any kind of gender con-
flict in their professional and private life. But
at the same time they are much more critical
and even hostile towards men in their inter-
personal relations. This hidden and nonreali-
zed gender conflict could be consider as one
of the main obstacle to creating women’s rights
activism and reforming the gender system
(Zdravomyslova, Arutyunyn 1998).
In the low chamber of the Russian parlia-
ment, the Fourth State Duma, elected in 2003,
there are women among the 450 elected de-
puties, i.e. 7.6%. The representation of women
in party lists and the share of women among
electoral candidates to the State Duma in sin-
gle-ballot ridings are 12%.  The dynamics of
women’s political activity in the Samara region
in late 1990s confirms a Russia-wide tendency
of civic and political “demobilization” of the
masses. In 2002 two out of the eleven candi-
dates became deputies of the Samara Gubern-
skaya Duma (out of 25 members); in 2003 no-
ne out of the 7 Samara women candidates won
at the federal elections to the State Duma. At
the local authority level in the city of Samara
official indeces of women, participating in the
decision-making process, are more impressi-
ve: out of 18 deputies of the City Duma, who
were elected in 2004, eight were women. As
far as the organized social activity is concer-
ned here statistical data also give us some ho-
pe. Among 2000 non-government organiza-
tions registered in the region about 7 were re-
ferred to as women’s non-government organi-
zations in 2004. The above mentioned num-
bers of organizations as well as 600 other wo-
men’s non-government organizations registe-
red all over the country in the Russian Fede-
ration Ministry of Justice wouldn’t mislead a
Russian reader. The thing is that some of the-
se organizations existed only on paper from
the very beginning, others were dismissed long
ago, and some of regional organizations, being
branches of other organizations, hadn’t ever
pursued their own policies. In order to con-
duct the research on women’s political activi-
ty in the Samara region we managed to find
only five actually existing and functioning wo-
men’s non-government organizations by the
autumn of 1999.
The research on political and social acti-
vity of women was carried out in the context
of the essential question of Russia’s post-so-
cialist development. It considers the issue:
what strategies of socio-political activities fa-
cilitate actual advancement of the country in
the development of civil society and consoli-
dation of democratic policies?
Political Participation:
Gender-Neutral Strategy
Analysis of the interviews made it possib-
le to distinguish between two groups of regio-
nal women politicians. The division into these
groups is based upon their understanding of
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the problem of women’s representation in go-
vernment structures as well as their attitude
to decision-making processes in general. Sub-
jective interpretation of one’s own political
participation reflects in many ways two pos-
sible approaches to women’s political strate-
gies and estimation of their effectiveness.
The first approach, which can be called
the gender-neutral approach, is ideologically
connected with the liberal direction in the
worldwide women is movements. It is based
on the recognition of principles that comprise
gender equality of rights and absence of gen-
der distinctions in the political sphere. Over-
coming of structural and situational barriers
leads (in its supporters’ opinion) to overco-
ming of women’s marginalization in politics
and gives them the opportunities and rights
to take part in governing processes on a par
with men. For this reason political attention
should be directed towards professionalism
and the search for allies in party and politics.
As women’s movements were developing and
political resources in government structures
were growing the second – the gender-sensiti-
ve approach to political participation – was for-
med. It has the objective of finding out gen-
der differences in preferences, values and pri-
orities of electorate and politicians as well as
that of determining a specific women’s role and
interests in decision-making processes.
It was the first group of politicians (those
who uphold the neutral-gender approach to-
wards understanding their own activity) which
appeared to be the most numerous in our rese-
arch. In their opinion in politics there can’t and
shouldn’t be any specific women’s interests or
women’s type of leadership (and correspondin-
gly any specific role of women in politics):
“There are not any specific feminine or mascu-
line interests, there are only problems common to
all which should be solved. The differences betwe-
en men and women in politics must be as little as
possible. Just as there doesn’t exist any feminine
or masculine style in politics”(The Chairwoman of
the Gubernskaya Duma Legislative Committee).
The denial of the necessity to pursue a
specific policy with regard for gender distinc-
tions is expressed in many cases as unwillin-
gness to lower the level of one’s own political
pride. Since “specific” women’s interests are
associated in the public politics or conscious-
ness either with the experience of Soviet Sta-
te paternalism or with exceptionally women’s
responsibilities for “un-prestigious” social
sphere, then a policy with “a woman’s face” is
considered in their opinion as rather weak, so-
mewhat defective, inferior and secondary.
They explain that they wouldn’t like to ac-
centuate women’s themes in political debates
especially during election campaigns because
of the fear of meeting condescending and
skeptical attitudes towards their civic and pro-
fessional standing. “We should always remem-
ber famous politician Galina Starovoitova’s
words: “neither her starting point nor her gen-
der should restrict the advancement of a wo-
man-politician in politics”.
The politicians of this group consider fun-
damental problems of democratic consolidating
and organizing an effective economic system to
be more urgent for Russia nowadays. Therefore
they find the fields of common civic interests mo-
re important then that of group interests for their
political career. They claim to be guided by cate-
ring for the educated, the progressive-minded,
the advanced part of electorate, who expect po-
wer to be in the hands of professionals able to
design both social and economics strategies. That
is the reason they took part in the elections as
independent candidates.
Due to the political position of this group
the problem of women’s political participation
doesn’t seem urgent to them. The advance-
ment of Russia on the way to democratization
and organizing a civic society is slow paced.
This is caused in the opinion of “neutral” and
“independent” women-politicians by the lack
of “intelligently educated people of principle
who would have a deliberate active civic stan-
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ding”. The increase of numerical representa-
tion of women doesn’t change, according to
their assumption, the nature of power since
women themselves don’t introduce any parti-
cular positive perception of problems and
don’t facilitate the process of making signifi-
cant decisions:
“I consider that gender belonging initially doesn’t
include any positive or negative aspect. The City Du-
ma of Samara is quite a rare phenomenon, where at
its starting point half of the elected members were
women. However quantity doesn’t always turn into
quality. It is important what it is guided by. When
there were quotas for women, a woman often ten-
ded to mould her behaviour according to men’s be-
haviour instead of introducing her own positive per-
ception. Russian women are easily influenced after
they have been elected, they feel thankful. Many of
these women easily agree or are easily bought. The-
re is another problem with politicians in our country
– that is, having gained some definite political level
they cease listening to anybody” (The Chairwoman
of Samara City Budget Committee).
The fact that six women came to the Samara
City Duma from traditionally women’s spheres
– health protection and education- may serve the
proof of this statement, as this respondent her-
self sees it. In spite of this fact all of them except
this deputy voted for the reduction of expenses
on medical services and simultaneous increase
of expenses on bureaucratic personnel offered
by the Mayor. Actually for the whole period of
the Duma’s work only one of the eight tried to
oppose the Head of the city who usurped both
branches of power. The remaining obedient de-
puties of both sexes turned the local self-govern-
ment institution into a kind of  ”pocket” organi-
zation attached to the body of executive power.
 Political Participation:
Gender-Sensitive Strategy
The representatives of the second group of
politicians to counterbalance the first one, insist
upon the assumption that women do have their
specific interests and owing to their “nature” are
supposed to change the character of political po-
wer in the country. The gender-sensitive inter-
pretation of women’s political leadership in this
case is based on the essentialistic concept of spe-
cific, biologically determined female features.
Key-expressions widely used by this group in an
election campaign comprise such word combi-
nations as “a mother-woman” and “a housekee-
per-woman”. Their political strategies are based
on this ideology. Correspondingly a specific “mis-
sion” of women in politics is understood as tra-
ditional responsibility for women’s sphere, spe-
cifically social and family politics. Assigning per-
sonal responsibility for the problems in this sphe-
re only to women, “feminine -women” declare
men to be unable to solve these problems be-
cause of their “nature:
“I’m sure if the city fell into the hands of women
it would make it possible to start things going. Eve-
ry home should have a housekeeper. The fact that
we are not satisfied with our life nowadays, in the
first place is our fault. Women haven’t informed men
that they don’t feel comfortable in such a society
and in such a city. The city and our country are parts
of a big household and we should do exactly what
we are used to doing in our home. Women can ar-
range life better. A woman will never send children
to war to be killed by tanks, will not step over a hel-
pless old man, will never pass by a crying child or a
stray dog. The reason for it is the feeling of sensiti-
vity and understanding of other people’s sufferings
which is inborn with us” (a State Duma deputy, for-
mer candidate for the Mayor).
The “housekeeper’s” strategy functions
rather successfully at regional and city elec-
tions. As sociological studies show, the type
of “a firm manager and defender”, “the chief
of the city” regardless of the sex extensively
meets the requirements of the structure of va-
lues found in the political culture of provin-
cial Russia (Meleshkina 1997; 38).
The only woman-mayor in the Samara re-
gion in her interviews constantly stresses her
managerial experience while being, in her
words, ”absolutely politically independent”:
“I don’t claim to be a member of the political eli-
te in our region, because you have to do something
of merit to deserve it”.
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As analysts say the fact that they were ac-
tive in district social security bodies facilita-
ted and determined the victory of women at
elections to the Regional Duma.
One of the distinguishing features of “a wo-
man-housekeeper’s” rhetoric is her readiness to
accept “secondary nature” of both her sphere of
influence and her role in the society:
“Let women put everything in order in a so-
cial sphere and let men, if they want, take up defen-
se, space, oil and gas”(a State Duma deputy).
Social policy priorities political participation
of women’s policy is proved by the experience of
women’s representation in worldwide politics.
Standing for this idea the politicians of this se-
cond group try to meet the traditional expecta-
tion and even insist on maintaining seniority re-
lations; they don’t claim for more power then pro-
vided by any gender system. Their strategy of pre-
election behavior is “a submissive style “not irri-
tating” neither the male member of the electo-
rate nor their party colleagues:
“A woman-politician shouldn’t be too proud. You
needn’t dream of wide scale actions, you must do
routine work. You can win the respect of all only
doing specific deeds. We enter the realm of politics
not to fight men but to help them to look at pro-
blems with our eyes. Can men really be disappoin-
ted if we put everything in order in our country?”
(a Regional Duma deputy).
As these politicians see it, drawing pub-
lic attention to their dependence makes pre-
election strategy under traditional condi-
tions of gender culture in Russia rather suc-
cessful.
It is interesting to note that this second group
recognizes a professional career of a politician
for a woman as a “non-typical” one, and this fe-
ature is characteristic of their rhetoric. Populari-
zing a specific image and role of “a politician with
a woman’s face” they find it necessary at the sa-
me time to confirm the stability of stereotyped
gender norms for the rest of women. Since wo-
men’s political participation may be considered
rather an exception to the rule, then this model
can hardly be suggested to other women:
“Joining the idea of women’s and men’s equality
in political and economic spheres, I’m inclined to
be perceive a woman as a mother. This is where her
natural predestination is. I can’t imagine a woman
on a post of the President of Russia or a post of
Samara governor. Women are more emotional.
They are prone to feel failures keenly, they are inc-
lined to be subject to introspection. Such behaviour
is unacceptable for a politician” (a representative of
the regional administrative elite, the Chairwoman of
Family, Maternity and Childhood Committee, a for-
mer State Duma deputy).
On the one hand it is hard to estimate to
what degree should “limits” be applied to her
own resources and perspectives. Most mem-
bers of the regional elite have come into post-
perestroika politics from former Communist-
Komsomol nomenclature bodies. We dare say
that double moral standards (one standard ap-
plied to common citizens and quite another –
to themselves) are more characteristic of this
people. On the other hand such claims which
are repeated through a number of interviews
prove the conclusion about particular comple-
xities of gender identification and socializa-
tion of women in Russia.
Many Russian scholars show this specific
Soviet-Russian lifestyle called for an “impos-
sible mission” for women. It was necessary for
women both “to suit” an untraditional model
of behaviour (being professionally employed
outside the home was considered to be a part
of a typical lifestyle) and at the same time to
“match” quite a patriarchal system which inc-
luded specific ideas of femininity and women’s
predestination (Zdravomyslova-Stoyunina
1999; 43). In many cases “successful women”
try to use these patriarchal ideas to secure
themselves against accusations of “non-femi-
ninity”. If the reality doesn’t correspond to a
private-oriented model of women’s behavio-
ur, a woman ought at least to justify her “in-
vasion” to politics and government structures
with the necessity to introduce “women’s ca-
re” of socially unsecured citizens.
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Women-politicians from the first “pro-
fessional” group deny the specific gender cha-
racter of their own participation. In the end
they call for a change of the existing gender
system and reject traditional models of lifes-
tyles assigned to women. According to their
logic the effective strategy of political success
excludes the emphasis on sex distinctions and
the outlining of specific women’s problems.
“Women” politicians from the second group
hold the view of a biologically determined “na-
tural” gender role. Leadership for women wi-
dely acknowledged as an exceptionally mas-
culine quality should be either disguised in the
public sphere or must be forgotten for good
and one should surrender and take up the “de-
fense” and patronage of stronger politicians.
None of the regional women-politicians,
who won at the election, identified herself with
any women’s social organization. The politi-
cians of the first “professional” group won
their seats in the local authority bodies as in-
dependent candidates. The political strategies
of the second group with their traditional gen-
der roles of “a mother” and “a housekeeper”
appeared to be successful in using the resour-
ces of stronger parties. The rhetoric “I am as
a woman and a mother” in addition to acknow-
ledging her dependence on support the gover-
nor (“the governor offered my participating
at the election and I agreed”) caused this can-
didate to be included in governor’s team to its
advantage. The firm belief that a future depu-
ty should be trustworthy, devoted and thank-
ful became more important for the choice of a
“suitable” candidate.
The fact, that women-candidates from the
second group fully recognize their dependen-
ce and also emphasize their “destiny” to carry
out routine “un-prestigious for men” work,
makes this group a more convenient choice for
stronger parties. The lack of electoral resour-
ces makes women weak competitors in the
struggle for power. Taking this lack of support
into consideration women have to find an op-
portunity to be nominated by parties (to a lar-
ger extent than men). It will enhance their
chances to win. On the other hand weak can-
didates are useful for strong parties because
the latter in case of victory can count on their
deputy’s discipline, loyalty and subordination.
Moderation in political views, which actually
means ideological indistinctiveness, becomes
an inevitable part of the electoral strategy con-
cerning women-politicians.
The identification of women is policy with
social policy in general and family policy in
particular becomes their only tramp card. Un-
derlying this interpretation there is the worl-
dwide public opinion which is accepted in Rus-
sia as well; namely – the accession of women
to power is proof of the success in strengthe-
ning federal social functions and forming “a
welfare state”. The paradox of applying this
rule to Russia is in the fact that though “hou-
sekeeper-deputies” aim at solving problems
connected with the status of women in socie-
ty, but they are not ready to extend the tradi-
tional range of issues, to raise questions con-
cerning employment and professional career
discrimination, women’s job ensurance, violen-
ce at home, advancement of women into go-
vernment structures and etc. Meanwhile “in-
dependent professionals” in their turn direct
their attention toward general democratic and
civic ideals and don’t single out “women’s” po-
licy. However in the course of their political
activity the latter become aware of gender disc-
rimination problems and the need to stand for
women’s rights in making decisions concerning
fundamental problems.
  Political Discourses of Women’s Movement
We can classify women’s organizations in
the Samara Region as well as women’s move-
ments in Russia in general according to a num-
ber of characteristics: the declared sphere and
objectives of their activities, types of organi-
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zational structures, ideology, political orien-
tation, social base, etc. In studying the pro-
blem of women’s social and political activities
in post-Soviet Russia we feel it is important to
note that besides classifying the organizations
according to their ideological affiliation these
groups can be divided into formal social insti-
tutions (officially established) and informal
ones (grass-root institutions) (Temkina 1997).
Perhaps, the ”oldest” and the most nume-
rous (more then 300 active members) formal or-
ganization is the “Samara Union of Women”,
which was organized in 1987 on the basis of ‘zhen-
sovets’ – former structural units of the Soviet Wo-
men’s Committee. This organization doesn’t ha-
ve individual membership and is supported by
the network of district committees of the “Sa-
mara Union of Women”. Those district commit-
tees in early 1990s had to “invite for participa-
tion” (it was obligatory) women who were lea-
ders in different professional spheres. They we-
re “invited” because they could use their subor-
dinates (the female fraction at least) to fulfill the
obligatory “meropriyatie”. By the end of 1990s
the majority of these women-leaders had to re-
sign and part of them was able to get engaged in
social activities, working in the Committees wil-
lingly and not because they were obliged to.
Though the “Samara Union of Women” has a
juridical status of a regional social organization,
they also consider themselves to be a part of the
Russian socio-political movement “Women of
Russia”.
Women’s organizations in Russia as well
as the majority of non-government organiza-
tions don’t have their written platforms and
they define their ideological priorities mostly
through interviews, newspaper publications
and election campaign documents. In stating
the ideological strategy of the “Samara Union
of Women”, its Chairwoman stressed the ad-
herence to the general point of view on wo-
men’s roles and sticking to the traditional gen-
der roles:
“The Statutes of our organization states: our main
priorities are – family, woman, and children. It’s the
preservation of our nation, which is our most im-
portant goal, i.e. the preservation of women’s abili-
ty to give birth”.
Women’s interests are left to be determi-
ned exclusively within the family, the private
sphere. In our opinion more important here
is the fact that these interests depend on the
demographic and state objectives and that they
can be traced through the rhetoric of these or-
ganizations. Even the typical truism used by
women’s organizations – “unemployment has
a women’s face” – doesn’t promulgate indivi-
dual human rights but rather serves state’s ob-
jectives:
“Full employment is our priority; we received some
financial due to a decree at the gubernatorial level to
solve the problem of women’s unemployment. Wo-
men are specific category of the labour force, which is
determined by their ability to give birth. We are now a
nation, which is dying out; if we don’t create proper
working conditions for our women they will not give
birth to children. The birth rate in our country drop-
ped the moment the reforms started. Young girls are
not ready to perform the functions of a mother; are
not ready to sacrifice themselves to meet traditional
requirements. To live like a great nation – that to a
large extent depends on women” (the Chairwoman
of the ”Samara Union of Women”).
Both ideological closeness of the “Samara
Union of Women” to left opposition and its So-
viet-nomenclature roots can explain that they are
more concerned about the break-up of the So-
viet Union then about current women’s problems.
They argue for the necessity to return to the main
Soviet gender contract of “working mothers”.
The reason for this being that giving birth is not
women’s “natural predestination” (this is the
point of view which is being revived by mass me-
dia nowadays) but a “civilly prescribed obliga-
tion and civic duty of women”. There is women’s
citizenship understanding. A family has the bur-
den of solving state’s and nation’s problems:
“Traditionally a Russian family was referred to
as a productive, federal and military unit because it
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was from the family sphere that children were rec-
ruited to participate in wars. And what now? Do
we give soldiers to our Russia? Young people are
not ready – physically and morally – to serve in the
Army. And for this reason our task is to draw social
attention to the change of family functions”(the Vi-
ce-Chairwoman of the Samara Women’s Union).
Individual rights of a woman, her autono-
my and independence are supplanted by tra-
ditional concerns for the “collective good”,
which is said to be equal to state interests.
An ideological postulate about subordina-
tion of women’s interests and family interests to
the interests of the State underlies the activity of
social organizations and facilitates interaction
with the authorities who provide resources for
non-government organizations. Close collabora-
tion of the “Samara Union of Women” and the
Regional Administration confuses the left-wing
party allies of the “Union”. Some active mem-
bers of the Union in their interviews complain
of the “lack of understanding on the part of their
Communist comrades”, who accuse them of
“strengthening the existing power”. So to justify
themselves the interviewed women put forward
the idea of “unselfish” care for the good of the
Motherland and personal disinterestedness in
solving of those women’s problems, which they
support:
“Personally we need nothing, we have everything
– children, grandchildren, husbands; thank God our
families have already been formed”(member of Sa-
mara Union).
So, the political plan of this organization
appears to be based on the appeal to archaic
layers of collective consciousness and to dec-
lare gender “moral” politics with a maternity
face. The Samara branch of the “Union of Wo-
men” is oriented, as many contemporary Rus-
sian social movements are, towards the “ne-
gative social project”, which is formed under
the influence of conservative motivation – “to
preserve, to guard, to survive”.
For the Samara branch of the “Movement
of Women of Russia” there is no necessity to justi-
fy themselves before the left-wing opposition.
This movement stands apart from both left- and
right wing groups making moderation, centrism
and compromise its priority. Functioning inde-
pendently since 1996, the “Movements of Wo-
men of Russia” contrary to the “Women of Rus-
sia” declared a platform for the modernization
of gender system in Russia. Their main political
slogans are: demand for “parity democracy, the
ensurance of women rights, state policy of equal
opportunities for men and women”. At the same
time this modernist rhetoric includes emphasis
on archetype of “women’s mercy and motherly
care”. The declaration of the specific “nature”’
of women-politicians and “women’s policy” is
quite successful at the regional level. This is a
basis for mobilization of women in Russia, a
country which is going through a transformatio-
nal period of a traditional gender system.
The political activity of the Samara branch
of “Movement of Women of Russia”, unlike the
“Union of Women”, is limited. On a regional le-
vel the Samara “Women’s Movement” abstain
from public political activity. The leaders of the
organization find it to be disadvantageous to pub-
licly advance their own candidates and articula-
te “women’s questions” during election cam-
paigns. At the same time the task to increase wo-
men’s representation in government structures
is regarded as a priority. And to reach this goal
one may use the great potential of the informal
social network, which has been preserved from
the Soviet era and could be used to advance wo-
men to legislative and executive bodies.
Grass-roots Women’s Social Activity
The second group of non-government orga-
nizations includes the ones, formed at the grass-
roots level as a result of women’s initiative and
self-organization. The most active in the Samara
region since mid-1990 were the organizations
whose aim was to ensure the rights of soldiers,
young men due for enlistment and their parents.
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All these organizations included mostly women
members and leaders. From the very formation
of the organizations in the first half of 90s they
claimed and proved to be women’s rights-ensu-
ring organizations aiming at “teaching the ba-
sics of civic rules and democratic participation
in country’s life”. The most numerous and influ-
ential organization, which is a part of the Asso-
ciation of Soldiers’ Mothers Committees, has
functioned in Samara since 1990 and has, as its
leader states, 300 active workers. This organiza-
tion has the name “Synovia” (Sons). Its aim, as
their platform states, is “to teach mothers to de-
fend their own civil rights and their son’s rights”.
The main problem, except a financial one, as usu-
al, in its functioning is socio-political passivity of
women, as the leader of this organization sees it.
Not only the total illiteracy of the population con-
cerning legal matters hinders Russia’s advance-
ment to a democratic state and civil society but
also (and perhaps to the greater extent) the be-
lief that “we can do nothing, nothing depends
on us”:
“Nobody can help those who don’t want to help
themselves. We teach moms to defend their rights
and to demand that authorities act according to the
law and their promises. But those who are afraid of
military registration offices, who are lazy and don’t
bring their cases to the court can hardly expect any
success” (the leader of the “Synovia” [Sons]).
To gain resources and to raise the problem
of human rights in public discourse the Sama-
ra Soldiers’ Mothers Committee made good
use of one of the sacred Russian maternity
symbols. The appeal to defend mothers’ rights
provided for some collective actions commit-
ted to social change. These actions included
addressing authorities, mass media, consulting
parents on the rights of military man, organi-
zing civil control over the armed services, and
meetings of protest against the first war in
Chechnia. Active volunteer members were
mostly the mothers who were worried about
the violation of their sons’ rights during their
term in the Army. Gradually it happened so,
that the nucleus of the organization consisted
only of the members whose mission had been
fulfilled as their sons finished up their milita-
ry service. As a result in late 90s the “Sons”
sticking to statistic righteous rhetoric was un-
dergoing some considerable evolution in its
strategic and ideological direction.
Being organized to defend citizen’s interests
in the face of state authorities, at the time when
the second war campaign in Chechnia began in
autumn 1999, “Synovia”declared a new objecti-
ve – “to raise the prestige of our Army, to fight slan-
der against it”. So, in mid-1990s “Sons’ collabo-
rated mostly with the “Chechnia” organization,
which included the mothers and widows of sol-
diers killed at First Chechnia war. In the late
1990s a new partner appeared and it was the Sa-
mara Oblast Administration and military offi-
cials. Antiwar appeals to stop the first Chechnia
war were replaced with special “events” (merop-
riyatiye) organized together with the Volga Mili-
tary Okrug Headquarters. The meetings and con-
certs for soldiers’ mothers, distribution of gifts
appealed to notions “civil service of mothers and
their sons to their Motherland”. All activity was
provided according to popular Soviet song: “You
should first think of your Motherland and only
then of yourself “. Stepping back to the traditio-
nal and state values has caused the decline and
neglect of democratic principle to be critical of
governmental structures. No wonder then that
the “Synovia” didn’t react to the beginning of a
new campaign (by the Union of Right-Wing For-
ces) calling for a referendum about having a pro-
fessional army in Russia.
The majority of organizations of the second
type, which were created on the initiative of dif-
ferent women’s groups, are aimed at solving a
one problem. These organizations are: “Parents
Against Drugs”, “The Association of Mothers of
Large Families”, “Business Women Club”. They
are formed as the organizations for self-help and
have the objective to compensate for the draw-
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backs and deficiencies in the socio-economic po-
licy of the State. Such notions as “discrimination,
women’s rights, inequality” are not found in their
rhetoric and platforms. They don’t strive to in-
fluence decision-making processes, therefore
they stay away from any political participation.
Women’s Citizenship in Russia
The indistinctiveness and discrepancies of
ideological principles among women’s non-go-
vernment organizations prevent them from rec-
ruiting new members – young, educated women,
capable of achieving their own goals, enhancing
their personal growth, independent and oppo-
sing the traditional gender system. The leaders
of these organizations often explain the lack of
support by the passivity and “unrealization” of
their own interests in power on the part of wo-
men. Partly agreeing to this explanation, we must
take into consideration the slogans and ideas of-
fered by the organizations and women-politicians
themselves. They complain that the women’s
fraction of electorate don’t vote for them, but
their archaic idea of a woman’s “destination” in
a new wrapping doesn’t seem attractive to Rus-
sian women. We would like to agree to other in-
terpretation of women’s political indifference: “A
Russian woman keeps silent not because she do-
esn’t know what she wants, but because she wa-
vers between socially approved women’s mission
and the desire to find her own niche in everyday
routine”. The problem of self-determination, inc-
luding socio-political self-determination, is the
most complicated especially in the period of ra-
dical transformations.
Analyzing the forms of collective actions of
non-government organizations one can find out
that they are guided by the concept of the com-
plementary Third sector to the state politics. They
realize their objective is to help and support a
client, improve his living conditions. According
to the character of their activity the women’s or-
ganizations can be referred to as the so-called
service organizations. The content of their work
includes, first, the accumulation and redistribu-
tion of resources and, second, the implementa-
tion of projects for social assistance. And here
the leaders of formal organizations suppose that
the so-called “meropriyatie” (once-only well-or-
ganized collective action) can be of greater im-
portance than any routine work, raising means
for helping women in their everyday life, which
is the contrasting point of view of informal orga-
nizations.
One should mention that from all known ac-
tions of group influence (legal actions, lobbying,
events of protest, formation of concurrent struc-
tures) women’s organizations are inclined to use
lobbying and they prefer to act through informal
contacts. The third sector in Russia, as it has be-
en mentioned, doesn’t have the opportunity to
legitimately represent group interests through
any formal legislative mechanism. The existing
“patron-client” relations offer more opportuni-
ties to be successful in making decisions through
executive power structures, where there are mo-
re possibilities to use informal contacts. It is
easier for women’s non-government organiza-
tions to take such steps because the post-perest-
roika leaders of all the levels are still connected
with their Soviet nomenclature past.
Active citizenship means participation in de-
mocratic processes aiming at self-governance in
society. In this way, the boundaries between the
public sphere of society and the private life of
individuals are intermingled. Women as citizens
have tended to participate politics in localities,
taking care of everyday activities and contribu-
ting togetherness in ways that can be seen as de-
eds of everyday heroism. If the system-like func-
tioning of a welfare state leads to increasing pas-
sivism as far as political representations are con-
sidered, alternative strategies for everyday poli-
tics become necessary. Then the question is about
the possibilities to improve conscious capacities
to break the chains of victims and to contribute
to the emergence of active citizens who can spe-
ak for themselves. Women’s self-definition and,
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even more, their self-esteem is an important as-
pect of the active citizenship that can contribute
to an identification as a political beings”. Possi-
bilities for more reflexive forms of political strug-
gles against given social divisions can only be cre-
ated in dialogues in which multiple identifications
are produced instead of defending strongly fi-
xed identities.
The terms and ideals for political mobiliza-
tion are embedded in discourses that provide the
ground on which they are understood and from
which they gain their power to move people. Po-
litical solidarity can not be assumed on the basis
of shared “womanhood”. The cultural category
of “women” as a practical, everyday form of sub-
jectivity, called up by innumerable mundane ac-
tivities and practices. It is not the same as the
politically significant category of “women” as a
mobilized identity, a self-conscious social collec-
tivity. In order for social categories such as “wo-
men” to serve as the basis for mobilization, they
must first be constituted as politically relevant.
This is done through public discussion and by so-
cial movements. It follows that a commitment to
advance women’s interests – and the definition
of such “interests” – is never merely the reflex of
a politicians or a group’s subjectivity as women,
nor even their experience of discrimination and
oppression. Politicized identities are themselves
a result of public arguments and activities that
allow individuals to redefine their own sense of
self, and redefine events and social processes
(Gal and Kligman 2000).
Many scholars see the main contradiction of
the discourses on women’ identities and women’s
interests in the fact that the most post-socialist
women’s organizations centers on women’s col-
lective interests – that is, on women as a “cate-
gory” rather then as individuals entitled to basic
rights. Women’s claims may be framed either in
terms of rights or in terms of entitlements and
social benefits. The danger in not attending to
these differences is that viewing women only as
potential beneficiaries of welfare system may in
fact, and even unwittingly, reinforce traditional
women’s roles and perpetuate inequalities. Issu-
es of women’s identity, professional and perso-
nal self-realization  are marginalized in the pub-
lic discourse (Daskalova 2000; 360-361).
The women’s electorate as an absence of in-
dependence, obedience and the inability to de-
fend their political position has paradoxically per-
ceived the image of gender-sensitive politicians
as a non-aggressive, centric, moderate and eager
to compromise. For example, the outcomes of
Russian presidential elections of 2000 confirm
such perceptions. The only one female candida-
te to the President among 9 candidates, famous
politician, former minister and the State Duma
deputy, Ella Panfilova during her campaign has
accentuated instead of her professional experien-
ce and leadership skills the traditional female qu-
alities and her devotion to the state social pro-
tection of “new poor Russians”. But the role of
“social motherhood” has transformed her into
marginal political figure, received only 1% of
electoral support.
As it was above observed another paradox
of “feminine” politicians is their appeal to the
restoration of Soviet gender contract “working
mother” as the only one model gender role for
women. On my mind, there is even more dange-
rous situation from the perspective of gender de-
mocracy in Russia. This is their essentialist un-
derstanding and the traditional Russian sacrifi-
cing women’s rhetoric of individual interests and
rights for the “benefit of the family” or the spe-
cial women’s moral predestination. In the con-
text of the post-Soviet gender order it is more
important basis for women’s political activity is
the individual-centered orientation to the democ-
ratic values.
The political activity of women both at re-
gional and federal levels gives way to different
interpretations of researchers. The “optimistic”
point of view is based on the positive evaluation,
given to any manifestation of women’s activism
including the theme concerning preserving tra-
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ditional women’s roles. Any “display” of women’s
theme and women’s questions in public discour-
se is assumed as a basis for raising the question
about gender system reorganization in the futu-
re. “Moderate” researchers, to which the author
herself belongs, agree with this opinion. Howe-
ver at the same time they find the activity of wo-
men’s organizations and women-politicians im-
portant in facilitating the advancement of our
country on its way to democratization and the
strengthening of civil society values and gender
equality.
The agreement of interests and rights for dif-
ferent social groups at the decision-making level
is a necessary condition for the stability of a de-
mocracy. Political representation of women at all
levels of the Samara regional power reflects a
Russia-wide gender pyramid: the higher the le-
vel of power, the fewer the number of women.
The study shows that the female propor-
tion of elected officials may have only a loose
correlating with advancement women’s issues.
My research explores that one of the reasons
for women’s exclusion the political discussion
is the very problematical notion of women’s and
gender politics in post-communist Russia. I
think this reasonable for Russian young educa-
ted women to be suspicious to all political “fe-
minine” strategies that emphasize gender dif-
ference and women’s special political and so-
cial obligations in a context where individual
identities are submerged in the collective –
whether that collective be the nuclear family
or the nation state. The articulation of the real
needs and interests of women in a radically
changed economic, political and social situa-
tion in a complex, difficult and slow process.
The social change and the reorganization of
public and private spheres has led to the contra-
dictions and tensions between two agencies of
women’s empowerment. While in public sphere
we can observe sexist practices and rhetoric, in
private we see new and wider spaces and oppor-
tunities for pluralization of gender identities and
gender roles.  In the mid 1990s some scholars
came started to criticize the limiting effect of fo-
cusing only on the public sphere (media, legisla-
tive bodies, politics). Analyzing the interviews
with the ordinary Russian women on different
topics these scholars show more colorful and
complex gender culture. My own research and
thinking on political problems make me agree
with Anna Rotkirch’s conclusion. “Women’s so-
cial and political agency often grows from ten-
sions in the private. Greater personal autonomy
and reflective space can serve as the first steps
towards empowerment and public action” (Rot-
kirch 1999; 103-104).
In contemporary period the emerging wo-
men’s movement is speculating if women lose
their “protection”. However partial it is they
will have to fend for themselves and their fa-
milies even more than they do at present. This
reflects the dilemma of actually being both wo-
men (in need of some “specific” rights and po-
litics) and an individual. When policies assist
women as women (as mothers), they enforce
the existing gender code. It is also true that
these policies can lessen discrimination as they
can potentially lessen women’s sole responsi-
bilities for children and domestic job. Russian
women fear that new legislation will misrep-
resent the complicated reality of women’s spe-
cific needs and their universal human rights.
In this situation, introducing feminist and
civic consciousness discourse became the most
influential tool for creating women’s indepen-
dent political activism both at the personal and
at the political levels. So in transitional period
gender studies centers and university programs
emerged in Russia in 1990s in some sense are
more important for promoting women’s rights
agenda than the quantitative increasing of wo-
men politicians in legislative and executive bo-
dies. Since the beginning Gender Studies aca-
demic community has been involved in femi-
nist education and training for women’s acti-
vists. Without civic consciousness raising pro-
Moterø i r  lyè iø s tudi jø teor i ja  bei  prakt ika Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas 2005/1, ISSN 1392-3358
109
cess of perceiving their real interests and the-
re is impossible on my view, to articulate wo-
men’s group rights, create women’s solidarity
increase the political role in politic making de-
cision at all levels of power.
Social and political views of the majority of
women-politician as well as the ideology of non-
government women’s organizations in the Sama-
ra oblast, on the whole, stay within the traditio-
nal gender system. The task of actualization of
personal, individual potential of Russian women
and understanding their own political behavior
seems to be the most important in socio-cultural
context of the post-Soviet Russia. The next task
will be the designing of some common strategies
for political activities and political participation
in power structures. Gradual deliverance from
the  “full dependence on the state”-syndrome
should be accompanied by the formation of a wo-
man with an independent, active personality awa-
re of her civil standing. Women’s specific view
on general problems in politics, economics and
culture as well as new proposed decisions will be
able to ensure the involvement of women in the
process of gender system reorganization and de-
mocratic reformation of the Russian society.
Samaros Valstybinio Universiteto
Gender tyrimø centras;
El. paðtas:  Popkova@ssu.samara.ru
SUMMARY
The article analyzes public discourses on political le-
adership of women in the post-communist Russia. Based
on her sociological research the author differentiates two
main strategies of female politicians and women’s organi-
zations. The first “professional” group of activists consi-
ders women’s interests or women’s rights issues as margi-
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